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PRIVACY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE PERVASIVENESS OF DATA 
Paul Rosenzweig*
Computing power and data storage capacity are increasing at an exponen-
tial pace. We can now envision systems that will create individual dossiers 
based upon the electronic trail you leave behind in cyberspace.  This sort of 
“dataveillance” will allow the government to scrutinize the conduct of indi-
viduals and holds great promise for preventing terrorist acts. But these 
techniques also hold great peril as they may foster and permit governmental 
abuse of privacy and civil liberties.  Our current data privacy laws are out-
dated and do not take account of these technological changes.  They need to 
be updated. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the concept of “surveillance” has been taken to mean 
an act of physical surveillance—e.g., following someone around or planting 
a secret camera in an apartment. As technology improved, our spy agencies 
and law enforcement institutions increasingly came to rely on even more 
sophisticated technical means of surveillance,1 and so we came to develop 
the capacity to electronically intercept telecommunications and examine 
email while in transit.2
To these more “traditional” forms of surveillance, we must now add 
another: the collection and analysis of personal data and information about 
an individual. Call the phenomenon “dataveillance” if you wish, but it is an 
inevitable product of our increasing reliance on the Internet and global 
communications systems. You leave an electronic trail almost everywhere 
you go. 
 
  
 *    Principal, Red Branch Consulting, PLLC and Adjunct Professor, National Defense 
University, College of International Security Affairs. The author was formerly Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. The views expressed in 
this article are those of the author and not those of the National Defense University or the 
U.S. Government. 
 1 For an overarching history of the transition from human intelligence to U-2 spy planes 
and, eventually, to satellites, see generally TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF 
THE CIA (2007). 
 2 Law enforcement electronic interceptions are generally governed by Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 42 U.S.C.), and intelligence interceptions are 
governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
File: Rosenzweig (#6).doc Created on:  5/13/2010 5:35:00 PM Last Printed: 5/13/2010 5:41:00 PM 
626 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:625 
Increasingly, in a networked world technological changes have 
made personal information pervasively available. As the available store-
house of data has grown, so have governmental and commercial efforts to 
use this personal data for their own purposes. Commercial enterprises target 
ads and solicit new customers. Governments use the data to identify and 
target previously unknown terror suspects—to find so-called “clean skins.” 
This capability for enhanced data analysis has already proven its utility and 
holds great promise for the future of commercial activity and counter-
terrorism efforts.  
Yet this analytical capacity also comes at a price—the peril of creat-
ing an ineradicable trove of information about innocent individuals. That 
peril is typically supposed to stem from problems of misuse; in the govern-
ment sphere one imagines data mining to identify political opponents, and 
in the private sector we fear targeted spam. To be sure, that is a danger to be 
guarded against.  
But the dangers of pervasively available data also arise from other 
problems. Often, for example, there is an absence of context to the data that 
permits or requires inaccurate inferences. Knowing that an individual has a 
criminal conviction is a bare data point; knowing what the conviction was 
for and in what context allows for a more granular and refined judgment.  
The challenges arising from these new forms of analysis have al-
ready become the subject of significant political debate. One need but think 
of the controversy surrounding the most ambitious of these—the Total In-
formation Awareness program3—and compare it to the universal criticism 
of the government for its failure to “connect the dots” during the Christmas 
2009 bomb plot attempted by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab4
One thing is certain—these analytical tools are of such great utility 
that governments will expand their use as will the private sector. Old rules 
about collection and use limitations are no longer technologically relevant. 
If we value privacy at all, these ineffective protections must be replaced 
 to understand 
the cross-currents at play. The conundrum arises because the analytical 
techniques are fundamentally similar to those used by traditional law en-
forcement agencies, but they operate on so much vaster a set of data, and 
that data is so much more readily capable of analysis and manipulation that 
the differences in degree tend to become differences in kind.  
  
 3 An article by William Safire generated significant political controversy. See William 
Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35. It led directly to the creation 
of a blue-ribbon panel, the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee and, eventually, to 
the cancellation of the Total Information Awareness program. The final report of the Tech-
nology and Privacy Advisory Committee is available at http://www.defense.gov/news/ 
Jan2006/d20060208tapac.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Passengers’ Actions Thwart a Plan to Down a Jet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at A1. 
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with new constructs. The goal then is the identification of a suitable legal 
and policy regime to regulate and manage the use of mass quantities of per-
sonal data.  
II. THE COMPUTING AND STORAGE REVOLUTION 
The growth of dataveillance is inevitable. It reflects a fundamental 
change caused by technological advances that, like King Canute’s fabled 
tide, cannot be stopped or slowed. The opportunityor problem, depending 
on one’s perspectivederives from two related, yet distinct trends: increas-
es in computing power and decreases in data storage costs. 
Many are familiar with the long-term increase in the power of com-
puters. It is most familiarly characterized as Moore’s Lawnamed after 
Intel computer scientist Gordon Moore, who first posited the law in 1965. 
Moore’s Law predicts that computer chip capacities will double every eigh-
teen to twenty-four months.5 Moore’s law has been remarkably constant for 
nearly thirty years, as the graph below demonstrates.6
 
 
 
 
  
 5 See LINDA NULL & JULIA LOBUR, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND 
ARCHITECTURE 27 (2d ed. 2006). 
 6 Charts of Moore’s law are widely available. This one is from http://www.deepspar. 
com/images/MooresLaw.jpg (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).  
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The scale makes clear that the effect of routine doubling is logarithmic. Pro-
cessor capacity today is more than one million times faster than processor 
speed in 1970. 
The power of this processing capacitywhich translates almost di-
rectly into processing speedis immense. It is what drives the information 
technology tools that power Google and Amazon and make Walmart’s pur-
chasing system a reality. It also, more problematically, makes financial 
fraud and Denial of Service7
To this trend one must also add the remarkable reduction in the 
costs of data storage. As the following chart demonstrates,
 attacks a reality as well. But all the same, the 
trend is clear. And though no one predicts that processing speed will double 
indefinitelysurely a physical impossibilitythere is no current expecta-
tion that the limits of chip capacity have been reached. 
8
 
 data storage 
costs have also been decreasing at a logarithmic rate, almost identical to the 
increases we have experienced in chip capacity, but with an inverse slope. 
 
 
What this means in practical terms is that in 1984just twenty-five years 
agoit cost roughly two hundred dollars to store a megabyte of data. By 
  
 7 “In a denial-of-service . . . attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from 
accessing information or services.” U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, National 
Cyber Alert System, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2010).  
 8 Lev Lafayette, Definition, History, Usage and Future of Computer Data Storage, 
ORGANDI, http://organdi.net/article.php3?id_article=82 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (the graph 
is directly available at http://organdi.net/IMG/gif/historical_cost_graph5.gif). 
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1999 that cost had sunk to seventy-five cents. Today you can buy one hun-
dred megabytes of data storage capacity for a penny. On E-Bay you can 
frequently purchase a terabyte storage device for your desktop for just one 
hundred dollars. A terabyte is roughly 1 trillion bytes of data—a huge vo-
lume for storing simple alphanumeric information. Here, too, the prospects 
are for ever-cheaper data storage. One can readily imagine peta-, exa-,  
or even yottabyte sized personal storage devices.9
Therefore, the story of technology today requires us to answer the 
question: “What happens when ever-quicker processing power meets ever-
cheaper storage capacity?” Anyone who uses Gmail knows the answer to 
that question. No longer do you have to laboriously label, file, and tag your 
email. One may now simply store all the email he or she wants to retain and 
use a simple natural language search algorithm to pull up relevant emails 
from storage when needed. The storage cost of Gmail to the user is zero—
Google offers it for freeand the processing time for any search request for 
the average individual is measured in seconds, not minutes.  
 If that is for the individu-
al, imagine what a large corporation or a government can purchase and 
maintain. 
Data is now pervasively available and pervasively searchable. For 
large-scale databases of the size maintained by governments or companies, 
the practical limitations lie in the actual search algorithms used and how 
they are designed to process the data, not in the chips or the storage units. 
III. COMPUTING POWER OUTSTRIPS THE LAW 
Ten years ago, surveying the technology of the timewhich, by 
and large, was one hundred times less powerful than today’s data processing 
capacityScott McNealy, then-CEO of Sun Microsystems, said, “Privacy 
is dead. Get over it.”10 He was, I think, slightly wrong. Pure privacy—e.g., 
the privacy of activities in your own home—remains reasonably well-
protected.11
  
 9 A petabyte is 10005 bytes, a exabyte is 10006 bytes, and a yottabyte is 10008 bytes. 
 What has been lost, and will become even more so increasingly, 
is the anonymity of being able to act in public (whether physically or in 
cyberspace) without anyone having the technological capacity to perma-
nently record and retain data about your activity for later analysis. 
 10 Though the original statement may be apocryphal, many have quoted it since, including 
McNealy himself. See, e.g., Matt Hamblen, McNealy Calls for Smart Cards, COMPUTER 
WORLD, Oct. 12, 2001, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/64729/McNealy_calls_for_ 
smart_cards_to_help_security. 
 11 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (the use of thermal imagining 
outside the home without a warrant is an illegal search when it is used, even indirectly, to 
reveal activity taking place within the home). 
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American law has a phrase to describe this phenomenon; it is “prac-
tical obscurity.” Derived from a Supreme Court case, Department of Justice 
v. Reporter’s Committee,12 the origin of the phrase is instructive in illumi-
nating the change in technology. Back in the late 1980sthe veritable dawn 
of time for computersthe Department of Justice went to a great deal of 
trouble to create a database with information about the criminal records of 
known offenders.13 At the time, such records were kept in disparate data-
bases that were not connected to each other—arrest records might be held 
by a local police station, charging records by a district attorney, and disposi-
tion and sentencing records by a state court.14
All these records were generally public and, in theory, available for 
inspection by the press or private citizens. But in practice the records were 
so widely scattered among so many data-holders that no newspaper or indi-
vidual could incur the expense of finding all the information and creating a 
comprehensive dossier on any individual.
 Federal records were, of 
course, held by still other law enforcement, attorney, and court institutions.  
15 They were, in a phrase, “practi-
cally obscure.”16
The Reporter’s Committee case was a powerful expression of the 
strength of the paradigm of “practical obscurity.” A CBS news correspon-
dent and a press organization filed a Freedom of Information Act request 
with the Department of Justice asking for the collated dossier, or “rap 
sheet,” on alleged Mafia figures.
 Only the Federal government had the degree of need and 
adequacy of resources to undertake the task of creating, at great expense, 
the precursor of what is today the National Criminal Information Center. At 
a very great cost, the Department of Justice began the collection of criminal 
records on a small number of criminals who were of national interest. 
17 Their reasoning was, it seems, quite per-
suasive; since the information was all public when found in disparate data-
bases, it did not lose that public character when collected by the Federal 
government.18 And, if it was public information, then it was clearly subject 
to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).19
The Department denied the FOIA request, and a unanimous Su-
preme Courtwhose membership at the time included jurists ranging from 
 
  
 12 United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 762 (1989). 
 13 See Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of Press v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 
730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 14 See id. at 732 n.2. 
 15 See id. 732 n.1 (“Information of the type [sought] might be kept in twenty different 
offices or components of the Department of Justice.”). See also id. at 739. 
 16 See Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 762. 
 17 See Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of Press, 816 F.2d at 732. 
 18 See generally id. 
 19 Id. 
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liberal Justice Brennan to conservative Justice Rehnquistupheld the deni-
al.20 According to the Court, “[p]lainly there is a vast difference between the 
public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, 
county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a 
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”21 
Because of that difference, the Court concluded that the “privacy interest in 
maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be 
high.”22
The Court’s assumption that this would “always” be so did not sur-
vive twenty years. Large data collection and aggregation companies, such as 
Experian and ChoicePoint, may hire retirees to harvest, by hand, public 
records from government databases.
 
23 Paper records are digitized and elec-
tronic records are downloaded. These data aggregation companies typically 
hold birth records, credit and conviction records, real estate transactions and 
liens, bridal registries, and even kennel club records.24 One company, Ac-
xiom, estimates that it holds on average approximately 1500 pieces of data 
on each adult American.25
Since most, though not all, of these records are governmental in 
origin, the government has equivalent access to the data, and what they can-
not create themselves they can likely buy or demand from the private sector. 
The day is now here when anyone with enough data and sufficient compu-
ting power can develop a detailed picture of any identifiable individual. 
That picture might tell your food preferences or your underwear size. It 
might tell something about your terrorist activity. Or your politics.  
  
 
  
 20 Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 780. 
 21 Id. at 764. 
 22 Id. at 780. 
 23 I learned this from discussions with ChoicePoint’s former CEO Derek Smith and other 
industry practitioners. See also RALPH M. STAIR & GEORGE W. REYNOLDS, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 362 (2003) (discussing Experian’s collection of public records 
from government databases). 
 24 Stephanie Clifford, Online Ads Follow Web Users, and Get Much More Personal, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2009, at A1. 
 25 See id. 
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Back in 1993, New Yorker cartoonist Peter Steiner26 famously lam-
pooned that “[o]n the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” Today, as one 
observer has said, they not only know you are a dog, but they know your 
favorite leash color and whether or not you have been neutered.27
IV. THE POWER OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 It is all in 
some pervasive database somewhere. 
When we speak of the new form of “dataveillance,” we are not 
speaking of the comparatively simple matching algorithms that cross check 
when a person’s name is submitted for reviewe.g., when they apply for a 
job. Even that exercise is a challenge for any government, as the failure to 
list Abdulmutallab in advance of the 2009 Christmas bombing attempt de-
monstrates.28
By contrast, the system of data analysis that is the subject of this ar-
ticle is far more technologically sophisticated. It is, in the end, an attempt to 
sift through large quantities of personal information to identify subjects 
when their identities are not already known. In the commercial context, 
these individuals are called “potential customers.” In the terrorism context, 
 The process contains uncertainties of data accuracy and fideli-
ty, analysis and registration, transmission and propagation, and review, cor-
rection, and revision. Yet, even with those complexities, the process uses 
relatively simple technologically—but the implementation is what poses a 
challenge. 
  
 26 Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, NEW YORKER, July 5, 
1993, at 61 (image). 
 27 See Clifford, supra note 24. 
 28 Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, Obama Hears of Signs that Should Have Grounded Plot, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A1. 
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they are often called “clean skins” because there is no known derogatory 
information connected to their names or identities. In this latter context, the 
individuals are dangerous because nothing is known of their predilections. 
For precisely this reason, this form of data analysis is sometimes called 
“knowledge discovery,” as the intention is to discover something previously 
unknown about an individual. There can be little doubt that data analysis of 
this sort can prove to be of great value. A few examples will illustrate the 
point.  
Consider first Non-Obvious Relationship Analysis (NORA), a sys-
tem developed for the purpose of identifying potential threats to Las Vegas 
casinos.29 NORA collects data about casino players, hotel guests, em-
ployees, and vendors.30 It cross-references that information with data about 
subjects of interest (e.g., Vegas cheats, card counters, in-house casino inci-
dents and arrests, and even problem gamblers who have self-reported).31  
The intention is not only to immediately identify subjects of interest, but 
also to identify the good guys (e.g., customers, employees) who are con-
nected to these subjects of interest in non-obvious ways.32
The results of such a wide-ranging analysis can be stunning. In a 
typical year, NORA will identify employees who are also playing at the 
casino (a policy violation at some casinos), cheaters playing with false iden-
tities, and employees who have undisclosed connections to known cheaters 
or vendors.
 Does employee 
X, for example, share a former address (say, while in college) with known 
cheater Y? Is accounts payable employee A buying equipment from some-
one he knows? 
33
The story of Ra’ed al-Banna, a Jordanian who attempted to enter 
the U.S. at O’Hare Airport on June 14, 2003, also illustrates the value of 
computer surveillance.
   
34 Ra’ed al-Banna was carrying a valid business visa 
in his Jordanian passport and, on the surface, appeared to be an unremarka-
ble business traveler from the Middle East.35
  
 29 For a useful description of NORA, see MARTHA BAER ET AL., SAFE: THE RACE TO 
PROTECT OURSELVES IN A NEWLY DANGEROUS WORLD 340–45 (2005). 
  
 30 Simson Garfinkel, A Powerful Grasp on the Nonobvious, 5 CSO 30 (Aug. 2006). 
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 A summary of the al-Banna case can be found in Stewart A. Baker & Nathan A. Sales, 
Homeland Security, Information Policy, and the Transatlantic Alliance, in GEORGE MASON 
UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 09-20 (March 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361943. See also Charlotte Buchen, The Man Turned Away, PBS 
FRONTLINE, Oct. 10, 2006, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithinh/reality/al-
banna.html. 
 35 Baker & Sales, supra note 34, at 2. 
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The Department of Homeland Security operates a sophisticated data 
analysis program called the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to assess 
the comparative risks of arriving passengers. Based on those assessments, 
the inspection resources of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are allo-
cated.36 The system is essential given the sheer volume of travelers to 
America. Last year approximately three hundred and fifty million people 
sought entry across our borders, and more than eighty-five million of those 
arrived by air.37
ATS flagged al-Banna for heightened scrutiny.
 Since over three hundred and fifty million individuals can-
not, obviously, be subject to intense scrutiny, some form of assessment and 
analysis must be used to make choices about how and when to conduct in-
spections. ATS is that system. 
38 His pattern of tra-
vel and his prior record of entry to the U.S. combined to suggest that he 
should be subjected to secondary screening39—a form of enhanced indivi-
dualized review where a passenger is pulled from the main line of entrants 
and individually questioned. During the secondary interview, al-Banna’s 
answers were inconsistent and evasive—so much so that the CBP officer 
who conducted the interview decided to deny his application for entry and 
ordered him returned to his point of origin.40 As a matter of routine, al-
Banna’s photograph and fingerprints were collected before he was send on 
his way.41
There the story might have ended since CBP officers reject entry 
applications daily for a host of reasons, but al-Banna proved an unusual 
case. More than a year later, in February 2005, a car filled with explosives 
drove into a crowd of military and police recruits in the town of Hillah, 
Iraq.
 
42 More than one hundred twenty-five people died—the largest death 
toll for a single incident in Iraq until that time.43
  
 36 For a more thorough description of the ATS, see Paul Rosenzweig, Targeting Terror-
ists: The Counterrevolution, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5083, 5086–90 (2008). See also 
Privacy Act of 1974, Notice of Privacy Act System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,650–02 
(Aug. 6, 2007) (providing details of the ATS). 
 The suicide bomber’s hand 
and forearm were found chained to the steering wheel of the exploded car 
 37 See Customs and Border Protection, On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2009, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/accomplish/fy09_typical_day.xml (last visited Feb. 23, 
2010). 
 38 See Scott Shane & Lowell Bergman, Contained? Adding Up the Ounces of Prevention, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 10, 2006, § 4, at 1. 
 39 See Buchen, supra note 34. 
 40 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP: SECURING AMERICA’S BORDERS 4 (Sept. 
2006), available at http://www.customs.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/publications/ 
mission/cbp_securing_borders.ctt/cbp_securing_borders.pdf. 
 41 See Shane & Bergman, supra note 38. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. 
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(why they were chained is a fascinating question of psychology).44 When 
the fingerprints were taken by U.S. military forces, a match was found to 
the fingerprints taken from al-Banna twenty months earlier in Chicago.45
Now, of course, nobody knows what al-Banna intended to do that 
day when he arrived at O’Hare. It is impossible to prove a counter factual. 
Perhaps he was only headed to visit friends, but the CBP officer who inter-
viewed al-Banna later said, “I was shocked. That it was so close to home, 
that I actually interviewed someone who not only was capable of doing but 
actually did something like that. You never know who you are interviewing 
or what they are capable of doing.”
 
46
Most similar successes are not made public. Often, the factors that 
form part of the analysis cannot be revealed, and successes in identifying 
terrorist suspectsor, in other contexts, members of a criminal organiza-
tionwould be negated by disclosure of the success. Only al-Banna’s death 
made his case fit for public disclosure. 
 Without the data analysis provided by 
ATS, it is nearly certain that al-Banna would have entered the U.S.—who 
knows for what purpose. 
That does not mean that a careful observer cannot discern the out-
lines of other intelligence successes based on data analysis in recent events. 
When David Headley was arrested for allegedly seeking to commit terrorist 
acts in Denmark, news reports suggested that one of the key factors in his 
identification was his pattern of travel to the Middle East and his efforts to 
conceal those trips from the government.47 Dataveillance of his travel both 
provided the trigger to ask questions and the factual cross-check on the ve-
racity of his answers.48 Likewise, when Najibullah al-Zasi was arrested, one 
factor that was publicly disclosed as a ground for suspicion was his travel to 
Pakistan.49
  
 44 See id. 
 Both of these incidents, which involved serious threats of vi-
olence, would appear to have been thwarted, at least in part, through some 
form of successful dataveillance, i.e., using knowledge discovery techniques 
to target investigative resources based upon a careful risk assessment of 
seemingly innocent individual facts. 
 45 Id. 
 46 DHS Success Stories Case # 000016 (2005/03/01) (on file with author). 
 47 See Cam Simpson & Siobhan Gorman, Terror Suspect Failed a Test, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
9, 2009, at A4. 
 48 Id. 
 49 For example, the Department of Justice’s Motion for a Permanent Order of Detention 
cites CBP records of trips to Pakistan. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government’s 
Motion for a Permanent Order of Detention at 3–4, United States v. Najibullah Zazi, No. 09-
CR-663 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
documents/zazi-detention-memo.pdf. 
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Our failures also seem to arise when these sorts of dataveillance 
techniques are used ineffectively. In the case of the 2009 Christmas bomb 
plot, not only was Abdulmutallab’s name provided by his father, but the 
gathering evidence suggests that other, less specific NSA intercepts existed 
that might have generated a suspicion of Nigerian travelers.50 Add in his 
reported purchase of a cash ticket and the alleged rejection of his visa appli-
cation by the U.K.51 and the case seems to be the precise sort of concatena-
tion of facts which, individually, amount to little but collectively paint a 
more cautionary picture. In the wake of the failed bombing attempt, there 
are already calls for even greater efforts to “connect the dots” of terrorist 
threats and that will mean more dataveillance, not less.52
V. ANTIQUE PRIVACY 
 
Given the utility of this sort of data analysis, and the likely persis-
tence of the terrorist threat, it is, as a matter of practical reality, unlikely that 
governments will eschew these analytical tools anytime soon, if ever. 
Though some in the privacy community yearn for a return to the days when 
practical obscurity was a reality,53
Yet, as should be evident by now, the use of such analytical tools is 
not without risks. The same systems that sift layers of data to identify con-
cealed terrorist links are just as capable, if set to the task, of stripping ano-
nymity from many other forms of conduct—personal purchases, politics, 
and peccadilloes. The question then becomes how do we empower data 
analysis for good purposes while providing oversight mechanisms for deter-
ring malfeasant uses? 
 a realistic appraisal suggests that these 
tools are likely a permanent part of the national landscape for the foreseea-
ble future. As noted in the preceding section, that is not necessarily a bad 
thing since these tools play a strong and useful role in America’s counter-
terrorism efforts. 
Our current privacy-protective architecture, or, if one prefers, our 
anonymity-protective architecture, is simply not up to the task. It is, to a 
very real degree, an antique relic of the last century. The relevant Supreme 
Court precedents date from the 1970s,54 as does the 1974 Privacy Act.55
  
 50 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
people/a/umar_farouk_abdulmutallab/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 Is it 
 51 Id.; John F. Burns, Britain Says Bomb Suspect Was Denied Visa Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 2009, at A12. 
 52 See Ben Feller, Obama: The Buck Stops with Me, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 7, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/07/obama-christmas-bomberreport_n_414309.html. 
 53 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of the 
right to fly without showing any identification). 
 54 See, e.g., infra notes 56 and 57. 
 55 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
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any wonder that the current structure of law does not match the technologi-
cal reality? 
The Supreme Court directly addressed anonymity questions in two 
1970-era cases: United States v. Miller56 and Smith v. Maryland.57
In both cases, the Court answered with a resounding “no.” In Mil-
ler, the Court held that financial information voluntarily disclosed by an 
individual to a bank was not protected by the Fourth Amendment against 
subsequent disclosure to the government.
 In both 
cases the question was, in effect, to what degree did an individual have a 
constitutional protection against the wholesale disclosure of information 
about him that had been collected by third-parties? And, in particular, could 
an individual prevent the third party collector from sharing that personal 
information with the government? 
58 Likewise, in Smith the Court 
held that an individual’s toll recordsrecords of the phone numbers called 
by the individualwere not protected against disclosure.59 In effect, the 
Court adopted a gestational theory of anonymity—just as you cannot be a 
“little bit pregnant,” you cannot, according to the Court, be a “little bit un-
anonymous.” What you disclose to anyone else is fair game for everyone 
else. Though many have decried this doctrinal result,60
Therefore, all that is left to protect anonymity are the statutory pro-
tections created at the Federal level by Congress.
 there is no imminent 
prospect of a change in the Court’s view of the Fourth Amendment. 
61 Some laws, like the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA),62 create sector-specific privacy pro-
tections. Reacting to Miller, the RFPA prevents banks from willy-nilly pro-
viding financial data to the government, instead requiring the issuance of a 
subpoena and notice to a customer who has the right to object to the in-
quiry.63 Likewise, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act64
  
 56 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 
 57 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 58 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 59 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43. 
 60 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 
17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 546 (2006) (calling the reasoning of these cases “exceptional-
ly strained”). Others think the doctrine makes sense. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). 
 61 There exist state-based statutory privacy protections and most state courts recognize a 
common law right to privacy of some form. See Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Neither is an effective limitation on the action 
of the Federal government. 
 62 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006). 
 63 Id. § 3410(c). In some instances, where disclosure will compromise an ongoing investi-
gation, the government may convince a court to order the notice be dispensed. 
 64 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
File: Rosenzweig (#6).doc Created on:  5/13/2010 5:35:00 PM Last Printed: 5/13/2010 5:41:00 PM 
638 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:625 
has stringent rules regarding medical privacy and limiting the types of dis-
closures that doctors, hospitals, and insurers can make.65
By and large, however, in the counter-terrorism dataveillance 
sphere there is no sector or activity-specific set of protections.
 
66 Rather, 
privacy advocates seek to protect privacy (or anonymity) by requiring the 
government to adhere to broad principles of privacy protection. These prin-
ciples, known as the Fair Information Principles,67 were first developed in 
the U.S. and have now become the touchstone of most privacy protective 
regimes. They are embedded in the Privacy Act of 1974 and lie at the core 
of the European Union’s 1995 Privacy Directive.68
• Collection limitation: The collection of personal information should be 
lawful and limited to that which is necessary. Where feasible, the collec-
tion should be consensual. 
 In brief sum-
marywhich does not do them justice for want of detailthe principles 
are: 
• Data quality: Those collecting information should strive to ensure that 
it is accurate, relevant, and complete. 
• Purpose specification: Data should be collected for a specific purpose. 
Data should not be repurposed to other uses without disclosure and con-
sent, if at all. 
• Use limitation: Data should be used only for a specific purpose and 
should be disclosed only for the purpose collected. 
• Security safeguards: Information collected should be protected against 
loss or theft. 
• Openness: The collection, use, and security of data collected should be 
fully disclosed and transparent to the public. 
• Individual participation: Individuals should be allowed to access data 
collected about themselves and afforded a chance to correct any errors 
they perceive. 
  
 65 The Department of Health and Human Services produces a useful summary of HIPAA 
privacy laws. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/ 
understanding/summary/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 66 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is a notable exception, governing the collec-
tion of the substance (as opposed to the call record data) of personal communications. See 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1871 (2006). 
 67 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of the Fair Information Principles: The 
Foundation of Privacy Public Policy [hereinafter Fair Information Principles], 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 68 See Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006); Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L281) 
31, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_ 
part1_en.pdf. 
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• Accountability: Those who collect and hold data should be accountable 
for their adherence to these norms.69
In the U.S., these principles are procedurally implemented through 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and through the publication of System 
of Record Notices (SORNs).
  
70 The PIA is a detailed analysis of how a par-
ticular set of personal information is collected, stored, protected, shared, and 
managed.71 The SORN is the public notification of the existence of systems 
that collect and hold data.72 Taken together, the two requirements are in-
tended to provide for the openness and accountability that will allow the 
public to remain assured that those collecting data are adhering to these 
principles.73
The problem is that a conscientious and fair application of these 
principles is, in many ways, fundamentally inconsistent with the way in 
which personal information can be used in the context of counter-terrorism 
dataveillance. Recognizing this fact is not, at this juncture, to make a nor-
mative judgment, but merely to make the descriptive point that the way in 
which dataveillance programs like ATS function is at odds with these prin-
ciples. 
 
Consider that collection limitations call for the collection of the 
least amount of information and, where feasible, acquiring the consent of 
those about whom the data is being collected. Effective terrorism dataveil-
lance, however, relies on the breadth of the collection for its success since 
the unknown connection will often come from an unexpected data field and 
the collection often occurs without the knowledge of, much less the consent 
of, the data subject.  
Likewise, the purpose and use limitations, if fully applied, would 
significantly degrade the analytical utility of many knowledge discovery 
systems. Often the data of interest that gives rise to a previously unknown 
connection is one that was collected for a different purpose and intended for 
a different use. To take the most prosaic example, imagine that a phone 
number is collected from an air traveler so that the airline may contact him, 
and his frequent flyer number is collected so that his loyalty account may be 
credited. When those data fields are used for another purpose—for example, 
  
 69 See Fair Information Principles, supra note 67. 
 70 See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIF) 
GUIDE 4 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/piaguide.pdf. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Separately, the Privacy Act also affords individuals with the right to go to court to cor-
rect erroneous data collected about them. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2006). It is a never-ending 
source of friction with our international partners that this right extends only the American 
citizens and legal residents. 
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to identify potential connections between known terrorists and those who 
are otherwise unknown—these purpose and use limitation principles are 
violated. Yet that is precisely how systems like ATS operate and, in retros-
pect, it is a method that may have identified the 9/11 terrorists before their 
attack.74
Perhaps even more pointedly, the principles of openness and indi-
vidual participation are challenging to implement in the counter-terror con-
text. Full disclosure of the methods of operation of a dataveillance system 
would often make it easier, for those wishing to do so, to evade it. The no-
tion of allowing potential terrorists to see exactly what data is and is not 
held about them simply seems impossible to contemplate. 
 
The problem, of course, is that in this modern world of widely dis-
tributed networks with massive data storage capacity and computational 
capacity, so much analysis becomes possible that the old principles no long-
er fit. We could, of course, apply them but only at the cost of completely 
disabling the new analytic capacity. In the current time of threat that  
seems unlikely. Alternatively, we can abandon privacy altogether, allowing  
technology to run rampant with no control. That, too, seems unlikely and  
unwise. 
What is needed, then, is a modernized conception of privacy—one 
with the flexibility to allow effective government action but with the surety 
necessary to protect against government abuse. 
VI. MODERNIZING PRIVACY 
Our privacy laws and our conceptions of privacy cannot withstand 
the technological change that is happening. We must put theories of data 
availability and anonymity on sounder footing—a footing that will with-
stand the rigors of ever-increasing computational capacity. To do so we 
need to define what values underlie our instinctive privacy-protective reac-
tion to the new technology, assess how realistic threats of abuse and misuse 
are, and create legal and policy incentives to foster positive applications 
while restraining adverse ones.  
Though a comprehensive new anonymity-protective legal structure 
has yet to be developed, the outline of one can already be discerned. Old 
ideas of collection and purpose limitation will be forced by technological 
change to yield to a greater emphasis on use limitations. Even those limita-
tions will need to be modified so that our concern is not with uses that are 
mere “analyses” but rather with uses that constitute the “imposition of ad-
  
 74 See Newton N. Minow, Seven Clicks Away, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2004, at A14; THE 
MARKLE FOUNDATION, PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A 
REPORT OF THE MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE 28 (2002), available at http://www. 
markle.org/downloadable_assets/nstf_full.pdf. 
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verse consequences.” The new system will be based on the new answers to 
three broad questions: 
• What is privacy? 
• What new structural systems do we need? 
• What old rules need to be rethought? 
A. What is Privacy?  
Privacy is really a misnomer in many ways.75
As already discussed, the concept of privacy that most applies to the 
new information technology regime is the idea of anonymity or “practical 
obscurity,” a middle ground where observation is permittedthat is, we 
expose our actions in publicbut we are not subject to identification or 
scrutiny. The information data-space is suffused with information of this 
middle-ground sort, e.g., bank account transactions, phone records, airplane 
reservations, and Smartcard travel logs to name but a few. They constitute 
the core of transactions and electronic signature or verification information 
available in cyberspace. The anonymity that one has in respect of these 
transactions is not terribly different from “real-world anonymity.” Consider, 
as an example, the act of driving a car. It is done in public, but one is gener-
ally not subject to routine identification and scrutiny. 
 What it reflects is a 
desire for independence of personal activity, a form of autonomy. We pro-
tect that privacy in many ways. Sometimes we do so through secrecy which 
effectively obscures both observation of conduct and the identity of those 
engaging in the conduct. In other instances we protect the autonomy direct-
ly. Even though conduct is observed and the actor identified, we provide 
direct rules to limit actionas, for example, in the criminal context where 
we have an exclusionary rule. 
Protecting the anonymity we value requires, in the first instance, de-
fining it accurately. One might posit that anonymity is, in effect, the ability 
to walk through the world unexamined. That is, however, not strictly accu-
rate, for our conduct is examined numerous times every day. Sometimes the 
examination is by a private individualfor example, one may notice that 
the individual sitting next to them on the train is wearing a wedding ring. 
Other routine examinations are by governmental authorities—the policeman 
in the car who watches the street or the security camera at the bank or air-
port, for example. As we drive down the road, any number of people might 
observe us. 
  
 75 I first outlined these ideas in Paul Rosenzweig, Privacy and Consequences: Legal and 
Policy Structures for Implementing New Counter-Terrorism Technologies and Protecting 
Civil Liberty, in EMERGENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND ENABLING POLICIES FOR 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 421, 423–28 (Robert L. Popp & John Yen eds., 2006). 
File: Rosenzweig (#6).doc Created on:  5/13/2010 5:35:00 PM Last Printed: 5/13/2010 5:41:00 PM 
642 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:625 
So what we really must mean by anonymity is not a pure form of 
privacy akin to secrecy. Rather, what we mean is that even though one’s 
conduct is examined, routinely and regularly, both with and without one’s 
knowledge, nothing adverse should happen to you without good cause. In 
other words, the veil of anonymitypreviously protected by our “practical 
obscurity”that is now so readily pierced by technology must be protected 
by rules that limit when the piercing may happen as a means of protecting 
privacy and preventing governmental abuse. To put it more precisely, the 
key to this conception of privacy is that privacy’s principal virtue is a limi-
tation on consequence. If there are no unjustified consequencesi.e., con-
sequences that are the product of abuse or error or the application of an un-
wise policythen, under this vision, there is no effect on a cognizable liber-
ty/privacy interest. In other words, if nobody is there to hear the tree, or 
identify the actor, it really does not make a sound.  
The appeal of this model is that it is, by and large, the model we al-
ready have for government/personal interactions in the physical world. The 
rule is not that the police cannot observe you; it is that they require authori-
zation of some form from some authority in order to be permitted to engage 
in certain types of interactions, which are identified here as “consequences.” 
The police normally cannot stop you to question you without “reasonable 
suspicion,” cannot arrest you without “probable cause,” cannot search your 
house without, inter alia, “probable cause,” and cannot examine a corpora-
tion’s business records about you without a showing of “relevance” to an 
ongoing investigation. We can and should build structures that map the 
same rules-based model of authorization linked to consequence as the ap-
propriate model for the world of dataveillance.  
Thus, the questions to be asked of any dataveillance program are: 
What is the consequence of identification? What is the trigger for that con-
sequence? Who decides when the trigger is met? These questions are the 
ones that really matter, and questions of collection limitation or purpose 
limitation, for example, are rightly seen as distractions from the main point. 
The right answers to these questions will vary, of course, depending on the 
context of the inquiry, but the critical first step is making sure that we are 
asking the right questions. 
B.  What New Structural Systems Do We Need?  
Once defined, how do we protect anonymity?76
  
 76 This section is based in part on the essay Paul Rosenzweig, The Changing Face of Pri-
vacy Policy and the New Policy-Technology Interface, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, TRENDS 
AND CONTROVERSIES 84–86 (Sept.–Oct. 2005), available at www.dartmouth.edu/ 
~humanterrain/papers/intelligent_systems.pdf. 
 The traditional way 
is with a system of rules and a system of oversight for compliance with 
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those rules. Here, too, modifications need to be made in light of technologi-
cal change. 
Rules, for example, tend to be static and unchanging and do not ac-
count readily for changes in technology. As we have noted, the Privacy 
Act—the central statute intended to protect individual privacy against gov-
ernment intrusion—is emblematic of this problem; the principles of the Pri-
vacy Act are ill-suited to most of the new technological methodologies, 
such as distributed databases. Thus, we have begun to develop new systems 
and structures. 
First, we are changing from a top-down process of command and 
control rule to one in which the principal means of privacy protection is 
through institutional oversight. To that end, the Department of Homeland 
Security was created with a statutorily-required Privacy Officer (and anoth-
er Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties).77 The more recent Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,78 and the Implementing Rec-
ommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,79 go further. For the 
first time, they created a Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the intelli-
gence community. More generally, intelligence activities are to be overseen 
by an independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.80
Indeed, these institutions serve a novel dual function. They are, in 
effect, internal watchdogs for privacy concerns. In addition, they naturally 
serve as a focus for external complaints, requiring them to exercise some of 
the function of ombudsmen. In either capacity, they are a new structural 
invention on the American scene—at least, with respect to privacy con-
cerns—and their efficacy has already been at least partially demonstrated. 
 
The second significant change concerning how we address privacy 
concerns lies in the new focus on results rather than legal rules. We are us-
ing that new focus to drive and force technological change and encourage 
technologies that allow us to manage the connections between observation 
and identification according to new rules. The paradigm example of this 
shift is the mandate in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 200481
  
 77 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 222 (2002). 
 for the creation of an information sharing environment. That 
recommendation grew out of work done by the Markle Foundation and the 
 78 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3638. 
 79 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
53, § 1502, 121 Stat. 266, 424 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 1152(g) (West 2008)). 
 80 The duties of Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer in the Office of the Director of Nation-
al Intelligence are codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403–3d (2006). The Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board is authorized by section 801 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
 81 Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638.  
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9/11 Commission and recognizes the need for enhanced interconnectivity 
among Federal databases.82
Recognizing the reality of technological change, Congress took a 
different track. It simply defined the results it expected and tasked the Of-
fice of the Director of National Intelligence to issue guidelines and develop 
a system that protects privacy and civil liberties in the development and use 
of the information sharing environment.
 We must, as they say, “connect the dots” more 
effectively. 
83 To enhance transparency and 
oversight, it also required that these guidelines be made public, unless non-
disclosure is clearly necessary to protect national security.84
Instead of a static set of rules adopted once and for all, we now an-
ticipate an iterative process. The oversight institutions put in place will eva-
luate the efficacy of the tools deployed. Based on that evaluationand, 
likely, in light of further technological changesthe information-sharing 
environment will be dynamically modified as necessary. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the very same dataveillance 
systems that are used to advance our counter-terrorism interests are equally 
well suited to assure that government officials comply with the limitations 
imposed on them in respect of individual privacy. Put another way, the da-
taveillance systems are uniquely well-equipped to watch the watchers, and 
the first people who should lose their privacy are the officials who might 
wrongfully invade the privacy of others.  
Indeed, there are already indications that these strong audit mechan-
isms are effective. Recall the incident in the last Presidential campaign in 
which contractors hacked Barack Obama’s passport file.85 In this instance, 
there was no lawful reason for the disclosure of the file; it was disclosed 
purely for prurient, political reasons.  As a result, candidate Obama suffered 
an adverse consequence of disclosure which had not met any legal trigger 
that would have permitted the disclosure. A strong audit function quickly 
identified the wrongdoers and allowed punitive action to be taken.86
  
 82 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 400–06 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; 
see generally TASK FORCE ON NAT’L SEC. IN THE INFORMATION AGE, MARKLE FOUND., 
CREATING A TRUSTED NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2003), available at 
http://www.markletaskforce.org/. 
 
 83 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 1016, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. 
 84 See id. § 1016 (d)(2)(B). 
 85 See Helene Cooper, Passport Files Of 3 Hopefuls Are Pried Into, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2008, at A1. 
 86 Two contract employees were fired by the State Department in the Obama case and a 
third was disciplined. Id. In the case of Joe Wurzelbacher (“Joe the Plumber”), whose tax 
records were disclosed, several Ohio state employees were identified and disciplined. See 
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We can, therefore, be reasonably confident that as we move forward 
in establishing a consequence-based system of privacy protection we are 
also moving toward a point where the legal structures and technological 
capabilities to support that system are being put into place. 
C.  What Old Rules Need to Be Rethought?  
Perhaps the greatest dangers, however, lie in questions that we have 
yet to askat least those that I have not yet heard.87
Consider, as an almost trivial example, the use of red light cameras 
in several major American cities. Before the development of this technolo-
gy, drivers running red lights were identified only infrequently when they 
had the bad luck to run the light in the presence of a police officer. Now, 
with automated cameras, the rate of capturing wrongful red light runs is 
higher.
 These are questions 
about the nature of wrongs and the nature of punishment. While these new 
dataveillance technologies mean greater success in identifying, solving, and 
punishing wrongful conduct, such as terrorism, they are equally capable of 
identifying, solving, and punishing wrongful conduct of a more morally 
ambiguous nature.  
88
This change—the use of technology to make it more likely (if not 
certain) that violations of law will be observed—will work powerful effects 
on the deterrence component of law enforcement. We now calculate the 
optimal level of punishment by discounting the “real” punishment to ac-
count for the likelihood of getting caught. A ten year sentence with a one-
in-ten chance of capture has an effective deterrent value of one year in pris-
on. When the chance of capture increases, the effective deterrent does as 
well. 
 The same is increasingly true of a host of other offenses. Given the 
rate and scope of technological development, the trend will only continue. 
An interesting corollary to the development of new technologies is 
that they will, inevitably, require either a reduction in punishments across 
the board or a much better, and narrower, definition of “wrongful conduct.” 
As technology trends towards near perfect enforcement, society will need to 
  
Clerk Charged with Unlawful Search of Joe the Plumber, http://www.toledoonthemove. 
com/news/story.aspx?id=213580 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 87 I first discussed the ideas in this section with my friend and colleague Kim Taipale of 
the Center for Advanced Studies. See also K.A. Taipale, Play Room in the National Security 
State, (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Center for Advanced Studies Working Paper 
Series No. 05:0515) (technological changes are transforming criminal justice system from 
one based on punishment and deterrence to one based on ubiquitous preventative surveil-
lance and control through system constraints). 
 88 See, e.g., Kevin Courtney, Red Light Cameras Work, But Are Fines Too High?, NAPA 
VALLEY REG., Feb. 14, 2010, http://www.napavalleyregister.com/news/local/article_ 
1fbc2456-1932-11df-b32f-001cc4c03286.html. 
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re-examine its definition of what constitutes a “wrong.” To put it prosaical-
ly, in a world where we could identify every Senator who has illegally 
smoked a Cuban cigar or every individual who has exceeded the speed limit 
by the least amount, we might well need to change our definition of those 
acts as wrongful. Increasingly, we will need to consider how we can best 
enhance individual autonomy, and that may necessitate decreasing the 
sphere of governmental authority. 
Thus, one of the unseen perils to dataveillance is not, as most priva-
cy advocates suppose, the increased likelihood that the state will abuse its 
power by targeting for adverse consequence those who have committed no 
crimee.g., a person whose only act is to engage in political protest. The 
new structures and systems we are putting in place are likely to be capable 
of protecting against abuse. The real peril is that our conception of the 
state’s ambit has grown so broad that the state may soon lawfully use its 
powers to target “wrongful” conduct that ought not, truly, to be deemed 
wrongful. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It will be a significant challenge to determine the right answers to 
many of the substantive questions posed in this article. There will be sub-
stantial policy issues to resolve, for example, in determining what, if any, 
triggers might be created for denying an individual employment in a nuclear 
facility or refusing to let him board a plane. Yet these are the questions that 
must be answered. The improvements in computational power and data sto-
rage costs will not slow down, and we cannot expect to stop the deployment 
of new anonymity-invasive technology. Indeed, any effort to do so is 
doomed to failure before it has begun.  
Therefore, rather than vainly trying to stop progress, or trying to fit 
the new technologies into old principles of privacy that no longer apply, it is 
time for us to go about the business of answering the hard policy questions. 
Instead of reflexively opposing technological change, a wiser strategy is to 
accept the change and work within it to channel change in beneficial ways.  
This will require a rethinking of privacy—both a reconception of 
what we think it means and a reconfiguration of how we think it is to be 
protected. It may be true that “privacy is dead,” but for those who truly want 
to protect privacy, the motto should be: “Privacy is dead. Long live the new 
privacy.” 
 
